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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LA MAR ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
HONORABLE CLARENCE E. BAKER, 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, and GEORGE 
BECKSTEAD, Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8420 
Lamar Anderson, hereinafter referred to as the 
husband, and Florence J. Anderson Pluckard, former 
wife of Lamar Anderson, hereinafter referred to as the 
wife, were married, one to the other, at Seattle, State 
of Washington, on July 16, 1936. From this union there 
were begotten two sons, Craig and Brent, and two 
daughters, Diane and Michele. The youngest child is 
now of the approximate age of 10 years, and the eldest 
child of the approximate age of 17 years. Unhappy dif-
ferences having arisen between the husband and wife, 
their marriage contract was dissolved by decree of 
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divorce issuing on the 26th day of September, 1949, from 
the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah. 
(Tr. 15) 
On the lOth day of September, 1949, in contempla-
tion of the divorce proceedings, the husband and wife 
entered into a stipulation and agreement (Tr. 4) dividing 
between them their joint properties accumulated as a 
result of their joint efforts as husband and wife. (Tr. 4) 
The portion of that distribution with which we are here 
in this action concerned reads as follows : 
"It is further agreed that the one-half of the 
net sales price of this property hereby and here-
with given to the defendant, LaMar Anderson, 
shall be placed in trust with a trust company lo-
cated in Phoenix, Arizona, the name of which to be 
mutually agreed upon and selected by the parties 
hereto, and that said one-half (lh) of net sales 
price, less the costs of disbursements and handling 
of the same to be paid by said trust company, is to 
be paid directly to the said Florence Anderson at 
the rate of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) 
per month for the purpose of providing support 
money for the minor children of the parties. That 
said payments of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
( $250.00) shall be made until the said one-half of 
said net sales price has been paid to the plaintiff 
herein. Wh1en said one-half of said net sales price 
of said property has been fully paid to the plain-
tiff as herein provided, the defendant, LaMar 
Anderson, shall then commence to pay to the 
plaintiff, Florence Anderson, the sutn of Two 
Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month fot· the care, 
support and maintenance of the minor children 
herein." (Tr. 8) (Emphasis added) 
The real property above referred to was situated in 
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Phoenix, Arizona, and consisted of motel rental units ; 
at all times hereinafter mentioned and during all of the 
proceedings in the court below, said property remained 
unsold and the wife had possession thereof and received 
the income, if any there was, therefrom. 
The stipulation and agreement of the parties herein-
above referred to was incorporated into and became a 
part of the decreement of divorce, wherein it was ordered: 
"And it is further ordered that the provisions 
of said stipulation and each and every one of 
them, be and the same hereby are incorporated 
into this decree by this reference and made a part 
hereof and that each of said parties receive the 
respective shares agreed upon therein and that 
each perform the respective obligations imposed 
upon each therein and that the support of the 
minor children of the parties be paid as provided 
therein." (Tr. 16) (Emphasis added) 
On or about the 11th day of August, 1952, the then 
counsel for the wife filed in the Third Judici_al District 
Court a petition for order to show cause (Tr. 17) in 
which the wife alleged : 
"That pursuant to said decree plaintiff was 
awarded $200.00 per month for the care, support 
and maintenance of the minor children of the 
parties. That since the entering of said decree, 
and up to and including the lOth day of August, 
1952, there was due and owing to plaintiff, under 
the said decree, for the support, care and main-
tenance of the minor children of the parties, the 
sum of $7,000.00." (Tr. 17) 
Order to show cause issued. (Tr. 19) The husband 
cross-petitioned (Tr. 21) and alleged: 
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"Defendant alleges that under the Decree 
payments for support are not due to the plaintiff 
at this time since the Decree provides that a cer-
tain property was to be sold by either of the 
parties and one half of the net proceeds of the 
sale applied to the support of the children at the 
rate of $250.00 per month, and that such property 
has not been sold." (Tr. 21) 
The cause was argued before the court on the 22nd 
day of August, 1952 (Tr. 23), and on the 26th day of 
August, 1952, the court entered its Findings in part as 
follows: 
"That under the terms of the divorce decree 
heretofore entered in the above entitled action the 
defenda;nt was ordered to pay to plaintiff for the 
support and maintenance of the four minor chil-
dren of the parties the sum of $200.00 per month, 
i.e., $50.00 for each minor child; that there has ac-
crued as such support money up to and including 
August 10, 1952, the sum of $7 ,000.00, of which 
amount the defendant has paid $2,515.59 ; that 
there is now due and owing to plaintiff by defen-
dant back support money in the sum of $4,--184.41." 
(Tr. 24) (Emphasis added) 
On the date last above mentioned the court then made 
its order and decreed as follows: 
"1. That plaintiff be and she is hereby 
awarded judgment against defendant for back 
support money in the sum of $4,484.41, for $125.00 
attorneys fees and costs. 
"2. That the property described in Para-
graph 3, subsection (e) of the Stipulation and 
Agreement specifically incorporated in the divorce 
decree be sold as soon as possible. (Emphasis 
added) 
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"3. That defendant is hereby found in con-
tempt of court and sentenced to serve 30 days in 
the County Jail for his wilfull failure to comply 
with the decree of the court; that said sentence is 
hereby suspended upon defendant's compliance 
with the following conditions: That defendant pay 
to plaintiff the sum of $300.00 per month com-
mencing on the 1st day of September, 1952, and 
payable on the 1st day of each and every month 
thereafter until the further order of the court; 
said payments to be made at the office of the 
Clerk of Salt Lake County and to be allocated as 
follows: $200.00 per month as current support 
money and $100.00 per month to apply on the back 
support money." (Tr. 26 and 27) 
Thereafter, upon affidavit of the wife, the court, 
Honorable Clarence E. Baker presiding, did on the lOth 
day of February, 1953, order the arrest of the husband 
for the wilful failure to comply with the order of the 
court, dated the 26th day of August, 1952. (Tr. 30) 
On May 1, 1953, the husband petitioned the Third 
Judicial District Court to vacate its order (Tr. 31) The 
matter was heard by the court on the 12th day of Sep-
tember, 1953, and the matter was argued to the court 
and submitted on the said 12th day of September, 1953, 
and the court on the 5th day of February, 1954, ordered 
the petition dismissed. (Tr. 37, 84, 86) Counsel for the 
husband filed notice of appeal (Tr. 87) and designation of 
record on appeal (Tr. 88) in said cause, Florence J. 
Anderson, Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. Lamar Anderson, 
Defendant-Appellant, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P. 2d, 845. 
In that action this Honorable Court disn1issed the 
husband's appeal on the ground and for the reason that 
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the appeal was not taken in time and that failure to do 
so was jurisdictional and noticeable by the court sua 
sponte. 
The husband seeks here a writ of prohibition arrest-
ing the execution of the order of the Third District Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PROHIBITION IS THE ONLY LEGAL RECOURSE RE-
MAINING TO PLAINTIFF TO ASSURE HIM SUBSTANTIAL 
JUSTI·CE IN THE COURTS OF UTAH TO PREVENT A 
PALPABLE AND IRREMEDIABLE INJUSTICE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAIN-
TIFF IN ARREARS IN PAYMENT UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND FURTHER ERRED IN 
SENTENCING THE PLAINTIFF TO AN IMPRISONMENT 
FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PROHIBITION IS THE ONLY LEGAL RECOURSE RE-
MAINING TO PLAINTIFF TO ASSURE HIM SUBSTANTIAL 
JUSTI·CE IN THE COURTS OF UTAH TO PREVENT A 
PALPABLE AND IRREMEDIABLE INJUSTICE. 
Plaintiff is confronted with incarceration in the gaol 
for contempt of court, and, we think, for a contempt 
based upon a wrongful and arbitrary exercise of its 
jurisdiction by the defendant Court. It has been recently 
held that: 
"Adjudication of 'contempt of court' may be 
predicated only on contumacious disregard of 
some writ, precept, decree, order or command 
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emanating from court in proper exercise of its 
jurisdiction." 
In re Roberts, 30 A. 2d 900, 902, 133 N. J. Eq. 122. 
Such a rule is so sound that it needs no further 
support. 
By its order the court has placed plaintiff in a 
position where he will be irreparably injured, and it is 
now clear that he has no adequate remedy to prevent 
such injury and has had none since the decision from 
this court in Anderson v. Anderson, supra. In such case 
this court has said that it may use the writ in the exer-
cise of its sound discretion to prevent irreparable injury. 
11/layers v. Bronson, 100 Utah 279, 114 P. 2d 213, 136 
A.L.R. 698; Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P. 2d 377; 
Olsen v. District Court, 106 Utah 220, 147 P. 2d 471. 
In Mayers v. Bronson, supra, the writ issued because 
the plaintiff, in order to pursue his remedy by appeal, 
would either have had to forego a claim for immunity or 
refuse and risk a sentence for contempt. In the case at 
bar your plaintiff has no further remedy by appeal and 
has already been sentenced for the contempt. Therefore 
he is more deserving of this extraordinary writ than 
was the petitioner, Mayers. The original purpose of the 
writ was to secure the sovereign rights and preserve the 
public quiet; * * * it has been said, to prevent some 
great outrage upon the settled principles of law and pro-
cedure, in cases where wrong, damage, and injustice are 
likely to follow from such action. See 42 Am. J ur., 
Prohibition, page 141, and cases there cited. 
In the case of People ex rel Childs, v. Extraordinary 
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Trial Term of Supreme Court, 228 N.Y. 463, 468, 127 
N.E. 486-7, tlv~ court said: 
"The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary 
remedy for unusual cases, resorted to, not to 
correct errors, but in aid of substantial justice . 
• * * " 
For plaintiff we would contend that incarceration in 
the gaol for the failure to perform what he had not by 
the original decree of divorce been ordered to perform 
would most certainly do unto him a substantial injustice. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAIN-
TIFF IN ARREARS IN PAYMENT UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND FURTHER ERRED IN 
SENTENCING THE PLAINTIFF TO AN IMPRISONMENT 
FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
The action commenced in the court below was an 
order to show cause, based upon a divorce decree, in 
which plaintiff incorrectly alleged that the said decree 
provided for the payment of $200.00 per month support 
monies co1'nm.encing with the entry of said decree. Had 
the action in the court below been a petition to modify 
the decree, then the court, without altering the terms of 
the original decree which was based upon the facts ex-
istent at the time said decree was made, would have been 
in a position to adjudicate the equities and to give to 
the wife in that cause any proper relief for which she 
could show entitlement. It was error for the court below 
to alter the terms of the original decree by proceeding 
under an order to show cause. Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 
456, 154 P. 952. So long as an original decree ~tands, the 
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parties are bound by the terms thereof; this court so 
held a husband, ( Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P. 
2d 233) and a wife must also be so held- at least until 
she pleads and proves a change in circumstances such 
as to require, in fairness and equity, a change in the 
terms of the decree. Osmus v. Osmus, supra, and cases 
there cited. 
vV e do not here contend that a decree of divorce in 
which a property settlement agreement has been incor-
porated cannot be modified. Our law provides for sub-
sequent changes and new orders, 30-3-5, UCA 1953; but 
subsequent changes cannot be made without limitation 
and a court cannot change or modify a judgment at will. 
In the instant case, the decree of divorce provides, 
in part: 
"4. That the plaintiff, Florence J. Anderson, 
be not awarded any alimony and that henceforth 
she not be entitled to any; the said plaintiff, hav-
ing in her stipulation with the defendant, elected 
to receive a cash award as alimony and as and for 
complete settlement of the same as provided in 
said stipulation. * * * 
"6. And it is further ordered that the pro-
visions of said stipulation and each and every one 
of them, be and the same hereby are incorporated 
into this decree by this reference and made a part 
hereof and that each of said parties receive the 
respective shares agreed upon therein and that 
each perform the respective obligations imposed 
upon each therein and that the support of the 
minor children of the parties be paid as provided 
therein." (Emphasis added) 
The stipulation and agreement, the terms of which 
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the court ordered the parties to comply with, provides: 
"5. It is further agreed between the parties, 
subject to the approval of the Court, that the pro-
perty described in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 
3 of this stipulation shall be sold, and that either 
of the parties may list the same for sale after Oc-
tober 1, 1949, and that the plaintiff, Florence 
Anderson, may have the income from said pro-
perty until the same has been sold. 
"It is agreed between the parties hereto that 
the one-half ( :lj2 ) of the net sales price of this 
property shall be the sole and separate property 
and money of the plaintiff, and that she receive 
the same in full payment and satisfaction of any 
and all present or future claim of alimony from 
the defendant, LaMar Anderson, and that she 
waives any and further claim to any right to 
alimony. 
"It is further agreed that the one-half of the 
net sales price of this property hereby and here-
with given to the defendant, LaMar Anderson, 
shall be placed in trust with a trust company 
located in Phoenix, Arizona, the name of which 
to be mutually agreed upon and selected by the 
parties hereto, and that said one-half ( ¥2) of net 
sales price, less the costs of disbursements and 
handling of the same to be paid by said trust com-
pany, is to be paid directly to the said Florence 
Anderson at the rate of Two Hundred Fifty Dol-
lars ($250.00) per month for the purpose of pro-
viding support money for the minor children of 
the parties. That said payments of Two Hundred 
Dollars ( $250.00) shall be made until the said 
one-half of said net sales prices has been paid 
to the plaintiff herein. When said one-half of 
said net sales price of said property has been 
10 
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fully paid to the plaintiff as herein provided, the 
defendant, LaMar Anderson, shall then commence 
to pay to the plaintiff, Florence Anderson, the sum 
of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month for 
the care, support and maintenance of the minor 
children herein." 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the decree and 
of the stipulation and agreement as above set out, the 
court below found said LaMar Anderson delinquent in 
the payment of support monies in the amount of "$200.00 
per month i.e. $50.00 for each minor child" from the date 
of entry of the divorce decree for an accrued total sum of 
$7 ,000.00. Set off was allowed in the amount of $2,515.59, 
which represented funds donated by plaintiff in addition 
to what the decree and agreement provided for. J udg-
ment was entered in the sum of $4,484.41 and plaintiff 
was held to be in contempt of court, and sentenced to gaol. 
Separation~ agreements are not contrary to public 
policy and they are generally enforced by the courts of 
this country and of England (see 17 Am. J ur., Divorce 
and Separation, Sec. 722, et seq.) ; they have been sus-
tained by this court. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 
152 P. 2c1 426; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 
111 P. 2d 792; Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P. 2d 
222. Our court said, in the case of Hall v. Hall, 111 Utah 
263, 177 P. 2d 731, at 733: 
"It is true that we have held that a stipula-
tion for an alimony settlement is only a recom-
mendation to the court-Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 
275, 139 P. 2d 222- but we did not mean by that 
11 
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that it was to be given no weight at all. Absent 
any proof to the contrary the lower court should 
assume that the parties best know their own finan-
cial standing and capabilities, and accept their 
stipulations for its face value, unless the record 
before the court obviously indicates that to accept 
the stipulation would not accomplish equity. To 
ignore the wishes of the partie-s without grounds 
for doing so clearly is an arbitrary and capricious 
act." 
The agreement between the parties should be en-
forced and if there is to be subsequent change or a new 
order made, it must be upon proper procedure and only 
after a showing by the moving party of a change in con-
ditions since the entry of the decree. Gardner v. Gardner, 
111 Utah 286, 177 P. 2d 743. In the case of Openshaw v. 
Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d 528, this court held 
that the right of a trial court to modify an alimony or 
support money award did not extend to installments that 
had accrued; it follows, does it not, that where, as here, 
under the terms of the decree, nothing had become due 
or had accrued, it would not be within the province of the 
court to enter judgment for a sum not owing thereunder. 
In the cause at bar, we do not come before this 
court on the issue of the responsibility of a father to 
support his children. Our cause would have little merit 
if such were our contention. We readily concede that the 
obligation does exist and that it is the prerogative, and 
in fact the obligation, of the courts of this state to en-
force such an obligation when they are properly called 
12 
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upon so to do. If conditions have so changed in the lives 
of the parties to the separation agreement since their 
voluntary entry therein, appropriate adjudication should 
be had to make adjustment therefor. Mrs. Pluckard has 
a remedy in the courts, and that remedy is to seek a 
modification of the terms of the divorce decree by proper 
proceedings through which she may obtain her just en-
titlement. The plaintiff here, her former husband, stands 
in jeopardy of imprisonment, and we submit he there 
stands without a showing against him of contempt such 
as would amount to a contumacious disregard of the 
divorce decree, or in fact, any disregard to the terms 
thereof whatever. 
May we take the liberty of further pointing out to 
the Court that under terms of the Stipulation and Agree-
ment between the parties hereto and the decree of divorce, 
all Mrs. Pluckard need have done to commence her en-
titlement to payments of support money in the sum of 
$200.00 per month by this plaintiff was to sell the pro-
perty in Phoenix, Arizona and to have exhausted one-
half of the net proceeds therefrom at the rate of $250.00 
per month. Mrs. Pluckard's entitlement to payments in 
the amount of $200.00 from Mr. Anderson would have 
immediately accrued upon the exhaustion of the funds 
r·eceived from the sale, regardless of what amount of 
.r10neys the property might have been sold for. 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
The writ should be made permanent ; the plaintiff 
here, LaMar Anderson, should not be incarcerated in the 
County Gaol upon a finding of a contempt of which he 
was clearly innocent and which we respectfully contend 
came from a wrongful and arbitrary exercise of juris-
diction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
312 Kearns Building 
14 
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